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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Will Pryor *
“Y’know my heart keeps tellin’ me
You’re not a kid at 33
Y’play around y’lose your wife
Y’play too long, y’lose your life . . .
Some gotta win,
Some gotta lose
Good Time Charlie’s got the blues” 1
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a field that invites parties to a
dispute to pursue resolution outside the judicial process. Mediation, a nonbinding, informal ADR process facilitated by a neutral third-party, is sometimes
referred to as a “win-win” opportunity, where the parties control the outcome of
the dispute and negotiate an outcome that is acceptable, if not ideal. But in the
form of ADR we refer to as binding arbitration, eventually there is a winner, and
a loser—at least that is how it is supposed to work. As a consequence of a judicial
narrowing in recent years regarding the grounds for setting aside or vacating
arbitration awards, lawyers are searching high and low to find creative ways to
achieve vacature. This year we have an active area of appellate activity, challenges
to arbitration awards for “evident partiality,” and arguments that arbitrators
“exceeded their power”. 2
This is the sixth installment of an Annual Survey chapter on ADR, the first
installment being published in 2008. 3 There can be no disputing that in the past
* Mediator and arbitrator in Dallas. Yale University, B.A., 1978; Harvard Law School, J.D.,
1981. The author wishes to thank Corey Harris and Javier Delgado of The Merlin Law Group in
Tampa, Florida, Todd Lipscomb of Loree & Lipscomb in San Antonio, and Steve Badger of the
Zelle Hofmann firm in Dallas for their contributions to the section on insurance appraisals, Mike
Amis of Dallas for his input regarding public discussion of the Rule 169 debacle, and John Allen
Chalk, Sr. of Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Schwartz, PLLC in Fort Worth, an esteemed authority on
arbitration in Texas, and everywhere. Finally, as always, the author is grateful to Professor Ellen
Smith Pryor for her support, encouragement, and limitless talent.
1. DANNY O’KEEFE, Good Time Charlie’s Got The Blues, on O’KEEFE (Signpost Records 1972).
2. Fed. Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).
3. Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 61 SMU L. REV. 519 (2008).
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six years mediation has continued to saturate the legal marketplace, and the use
of arbitration throughout the state of Texas has skyrocketed—as has the controversy
that surrounds it. Appellate decisions abound. In this survey piece we will examine
a few of the more intriguing and important cases in ADR, particularly cases
pertaining to arbitration. For the first time we will also examine the
development of an ADR process unique to the insurance industry—the
insurance appraisal process.
I. ARBITRATION
Most appellate decisions addressing arbitration issues can be easily segregated
into cases addressing the “front end”—whether an arbitration clause is
enforceable and arbitration can be compelled against one party’s wishes, and
cases addressing the “back end”—whether an award published by an arbitrator or
arbitration panel should be confirmed or set aside.
But much attention has been focused during the survey year on whether class
action waivers in arbitration clauses are binding and enforceable, or whether
courts or state statutes can invalidate them. This attention derives from two
recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. CLASS ACTION WAIVERS
The first is American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 4 decided in June
2013. In an agreement between American Express and merchants accepting the
American Express charge card, the binding arbitration clause provided that
there “shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class
action basis.” 5 The merchants filed a class action, arguing that the cost of expert
analysis of any individual merchant’s claim, relative to the amount recoverable
by any single merchant, rendered pursuit of any individual claim impractical and
meaningless. 6 The Court held that the “[Federal Arbitration Act] does not
permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitrations” based on an
economic impracticality argument. 7 Addressing the holding, one commentator
noted, “If you sign an arbitration agreement that says you are waiving your right
to class arbitration, that means you are waiving your right to class arbitration.” 8
Expect these waivers to become commonplace in all sorts of contracts.
Only days earlier, the Court had published Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,
which affirmed an arbitrator’s decision that the arbitration clause at issue
allowed for class action arbitrations.9 The issue for the Court was not whether
the arbitrator’s interpretation of the provision was correct, but merely whether

4. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
5. Id. at 2306.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. David Garcia & Leo Caseria, Opinion analysis: A class action waiver in an arbitration
agreement will be strictly enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act, SCOTUSBLOG (June 21, 2013,
10:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinion-analysis-a-class-action-waiver-in-anarbitration-agreement-will-be-strictly-enforced-under-the-federal-arbitration-act/.
9. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013).

2014]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

103

the arbitrator (even arguably) was interpreting the contract. 10 The Court
explicitly was not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator’s decision,
and all but stated that the decision was wrong. This deference to the decision of
an arbitrator is consistent with the Court’s recent favorable view of binding
arbitration. 11 The opinion may have more importance with respect to judicial
deference of arbitrator decision-making than to the issue of class action
arbitration, in light of American Express.
B. VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT: WHO DECIDES?
In recent years, courts have wrestled with the preliminary question of who,
the court or the arbitrator, should determine whether an arbitration agreement
is enforceable, and what issues are included and excluded from the scope of the
arbitration. As a general proposition, courts tend to give great deference to the
authority of arbitrators, particularly when the arbitration agreement itself
includes or incorporates a specific rule blessing the arbitrator with authority to
decide these preliminary issues.
This deference was highlighted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nitro-Lift
Technologies, L.L.C. v. Eddie Lee Howard, where a claim was filed by oil field
workers in Oklahoma attempting to set aside their non-compete agreements
with their prior employer. 12 The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the lower
court and invalidated the non-compete agreements under Oklahoma law,
enjoining their enforcement. 13 The U.S. Supreme Court held this was an
impermissible usurpation of the arbitrator’s authority because “it is for the
arbitrator to decide in the first instance whether the covenants not to compete
are valid as a matter of applicable state law.” 14
Texas appellate courts will usually reinforce the principle that the arbitrator
makes the critical preliminary decision regarding arbitrability, assuming the
arbitration agreement or relevant rules contain an appropriate expression of
such authority. 15 In the survey year, the best examples include Jones v.
10. Id. at 2071.
11. Id.
12. Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 501–02 (2013).
13. Id. at 502.
14. Id. at 504.
15. It is the prerogative of this writer to remind the reader that this “arbitrator decides”
scheme is, according to many, illogical, to put it kindly. In his dissent in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), Justice Black responded to the majority’s holding that a
federal court, in the context of a claim of “fraudulent inducement,” may consider only whether the
claim is that the arbitration agreement itself was fraudulently induced, or whether the claims goes
to the agreement as a whole. Id. at 398–402.
The Court here holds that the [FAA] . . . compels a party to a contract containing a
written arbitration provision to carry out his “arbitration agreement” even though a
court might, after a fair trial, hold the entire contract—including the arbitration
agreement—void because of fraud in the inducement. The Court holds, what is to me
fantastic, that the legal issue of a contract’s voidness because of fraud is to be decided
by persons designated to arbitrate factual controversies arising out of a valid contract
between the parties. And the arbitrators who the Court holds are to adjudicate the
legal validity of the contract need not even be lawyers . . .”
Id. at 407 (Black, J. Dissenting) (emphasis added). By “fantastic” Justice Black did not mean
“wonderful.”
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Mainwaring, 16 a case involving a contract between future homeowners and their
architect. When the relationship went awry and the clients filed suit, the
architect sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a straightforward arbitration
clause in their agreement. 17 The homeowners, however, contended that the
Defendant was not a licensed architect at the time he entered into the
agreement, and therefore lacked capacity, rendering the entire agreement
unenforceable. 18 Quoting well-settled Supreme Court authority, the court held
that:
regardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a
challenge to the validity of a contract as a whole, and . . . not specifically its
arbitration provisions, those provisions are enforceable apart from the
remainder of the contract. The challenge should therefore be considered
by an arbitrator, not a court. 19
“[T]he issue presented in this appeal is who properly decides the issue of
arbitrability against a non-signatory—the trial court or the arbitrator,” wrote the
Houston Court of Appeals in Elgohary v. Herrera. 20 Seemingly at odds with the
opinion just discussed, the court concluded that “[b]ecause the trial court, not
the arbitrator, should have decided the ‘gateway issue’ of whether Herrera had
agreed to be bound by the arbitration, the arbitrator exceeded his authority.” 21
Is there an inconsistency in these opinions? Perhaps. But in the Elgohary case,
the clause at issue was in a contract signed by Gilbert Herrera, a limited partner
in a Texas limited partnership, signing in his capacity as president of the limited
partnership.22 Herrera, individually, was a non-signatory to the agreement. 23
Consequently, it could not be shown that Herrara, individually, “clearly and
unmistakably agreed” to submit claims against him personally to arbitration, 24 a
standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan.25
Consider this scenario. Plaintiff files a suit, which is followed by the
defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff files a motion to compel
limited discovery, a one hour deposition, to explore the issue of validity or non16. Jones v. Mainwaring, No. 09-12-00324, 2012 WL 6643849, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Dec. 20, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *3 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446, 449
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
20. Elgohary v. Herrera, 405 S.W.3d 785, 787 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
21. Id. at 793.
22. Id. at 788.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 790.
25. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 934, 944 (1995). Opinions can be
found in which appellate courts, somewhat inexplicably, seem to wander off into analysis of
arbitrability, under circumstances where it appears they should have been delegating such a
decision to the arbitrator. It would be reassuring if they would at least acknowledge the issue, and
perhaps refer to the “clearly and unmistakably” standard. See Jones v. Villareal, No. 13-12-00166CV, 2013 WL 656839, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.);
Baumeister v. Reagan, Nos. 02-12-00276-CV, 02-12-00277-CV, 2013 WL 530976, at *5–6 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Feb. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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validity of the arbitration clause. Sound reasonable? Not according to the El
Paso Court of Appeals in In re ReadyOne Industries, Inc. 26
ReadyOne[, the Defendant,] contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering limited discovery before ruling on the merits of
ReadyOne’s motion to compel arbitration because Flores[, the Plaintiff,]
failed to raise a colorable basis or reason to believe that discovery was
necessary or would reveal that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable. We agree. 27
The ruling is clear, but authority also exists for the proposition that the
“colorable basis” or “reason to believe” standard is irrelevant. 28 The prevailing
rule is that a motion to compel arbitration trumps all other pending motions
and proceedings, and must receive priority. 29
C. VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
In Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Systems, L.L.C., the Texas
Supreme Court found that where an employment agreement did not include an
arbitration clause, but an asset-purchase agreement between the same parties
signed on the same day provided for arbitration, a dispute involving both
agreements was arbitrable. 30 Regrettably, the result seems dictated by a
mysterious “throwing in of the towel” by the party that had succeeded in
persuading the court of appeals that only the employment agreement was at
issue, negating the obligation to arbitrate, and resulting in the short, per curiam
decision. 31
Most decisions addressing challenges to the enforceability of an arbitration
clause will recite, “In evaluating a motion to compel arbitration, a court must
determine first whether a valid agreement exists, and then whether the
agreement encompasses the claims raised.” 32 In Dish Network L.L.C. v. Brenner, in
a dispute between the satellite television services provider and a former customer
service representative, the former employee challenged the arbitration on the
grounds that it was an agreement between him and a corporate parent of his
employer. 33 The court determined that the agreement was valid, was not illusory,
did not lack consideration, and did not require Dish Network’s signature on the
agreement to make it valid. 34
26. In re ReadyOne Industries, Inc., 400 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.).
27. Id. at 168.
28. See, e.g., In re Houston Pipe Line Co., 311 S.W.3d 449, 451 (Tex. 2009).
29. See In re Champion Technologies, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005,
no pet.); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.021 (West 2012).
30. Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Sys., L.L.C., 392 S.W.3d 633, 634–35
(Tex. 2013).
31. Id.
32. Dish Network L.L.C. v. Brenner, Nos. 13-12-00564-CV, 13-12-00620-CV, 2013 WL
3326640, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re D.
Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 781 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
33. Id. at *7.
34. Id. at *4–6.
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While on the subject of non-signatories, it seems almost paradoxical that
some judicial decisions every year address circumstances in which one party
wants to compel non-signatory parties to participate in arbitration, and other
circumstances in which it is the non-signatories who want to be included in an
arbitration process. It is not unusual for these battles to occur in the context of
construction disputes, which almost inherently involve multiple parties, where
some of the parties will have a signed arbitration agreement and some have not.
In one such case decided during this survey year, a condominium owner filed
suit against an architect, a general contractor, several sub-contractors, insurance
provider, and insurance broker for damages to the condominium incurred
during a hurricane. 35 After a considerable amount of procedural jockeying and
motion practice, including the entry of an agreed discovery control plan and
scheduling order, the general contractor filed a motion to compel arbitration
and to stay the litigation. 36 All of the other parties, though non-signatories,
joined in the motion. 37 Interestingly,
Sapphire[, the property owner,] argued that it did not have a written
contract with any of the appellants, except for GTL[, the general
contractor,] and that its contract with GTL “specifically provide[d] that
there are no third party beneficiaries and that non-signatories to the
contract [could not] claim any rights under its terms, including the right to
arbitrate.” 38
Finding the arbitration agreement with GTL valid, the court nonetheless
concluded that arbitration was not required because the demand for arbitration
was outside a limitations restriction to which the parties had also agreed. 39 As
for the non-signatories, the court relied upon a specific section of the GTL
contract which “merely allows for the consolidation or the joinder of third-parties
in the arbitration proceeding. It does not give non-signatories a right to compel
arbitration.” 40
Perhaps of narrow interest, but still important to many, the Texas Supreme
Court took up the issue of a “donative arbitration clause,” a clause in an inter
vivos trust. 41 In a dispute between a trust beneficiary and the trustee, should
arbitration be compelled? This issue is surfacing for the first time in other state
courts and other state legislatures, and the Texas Supreme Court’s decision
seems to follow a recent trend:
Reitz’s[, the beneficiary’s,] assent to the trust is reflected in his acceptance
of the benefits of the trust and his suit to compel the trustee to comply
with the trust’s terms. Reitz’s claims that Rachal[, the trustee,] violated the
terms of the trust are within the scope of the arbitration provision, which
35. G.T. Leach Builders, L.L.C. v. Sapphire V.P., L.P., No. 13-11-00793-CV, 2013 WL
2298447, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 23, 2013, pet. filed) (mem op.).
36. Id. at *1–2.
37. Id. at *2.
38. Id.
39. Id. at *6.
40. Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
41. See Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 SMU L. REV. 247, 259 (2012).
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requires the arbitration of “any dispute of any kind involving this Trust.”
Thus, Rachal carried his burden of demonstrating that the trust contains a
valid arbitration agreement that covers Reitz’s claims. 42
Having discussed the threshold issues of validity and “who chooses,” we move
on to defenses to otherwise valid arbitration agreements. By far the most
discussed defense is waiver, specifically the notion that when one party
“substantially invokes judicial process,” the party may be deemed to have waived
their opportunity to arbitrate. Since the infamous Perry Homes v. Cull decision by
the Texas Supreme Court in 2008, many cases have addressed the issue. 43
In Baty v. Bowen, Miclette & Britt Inc., the Houston 14th Court of Appeals
summarized the waiver factors set forth in Perry Homes as follows:
[W]hether the party who pursued arbitration was the plaintiff or the
defendant; how long the party who pursued arbitration delayed before
seeking arbitration; when the party who pursued arbitration learned of the
arbitration clause’s existence; how much the pretrial activity related to the
merits rather than arbitrability or jurisdiction; how much time and expense
has been incurred in litigation; whether the party who pursued arbitration
sought or opposed arbitration earlier in the case; whether the party who
pursued arbitration filed affirmative claims or dispositive motions; how
much discovery has been conducted and who initiated the discovery;
whether the discovery sought would be useful in arbitration; what discovery
would be unavailable in arbitration; whether activity in court would be
duplicated in arbitration; when the case was to be tried; and whether the
party who pursued arbitration sought judgment on the merits. 44
Applying these factors to a dispute between a former employee of a
corporation and the corporation, the court observed:
The Supreme Court of Texas has instructed that in a close case we should
conclude that the heavy burden of showing waiver of arbitration has not
been satisfied. Therefore, in this close case, we conclude that the trial court
did not err by impliedly finding that the [corporation] did not waive their
rights to arbitration. 45
How close were the circumstances? Although the corporation included a request
to arbitrate in its original answer to the lawsuit, it did not file a motion to
compel arbitration for eight months. 46 In the meantime, the defendants filed
numerous affirmative counterclaims, requested a temporary restraining order
and injunctive relief—though these requests were never set for hearing—and

42. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 851 (Tex. 2013); see Pryor, supra note 41 (discussing
Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011) rev’d, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013).
43. See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008). See discussion at Will Pryor,
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 SMU L. REV. 843, 845–48 (2009).
44. Baty v. Bowen, Miclette & Britt, Inc., No. 14-11-00663-CV, 2013 WL 2253584, at *4–5
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 23, 2013, pet. denied) (citing Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at
591–92).
45. Id. at *12.
46. Id. at *2.
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engaged in “significant” discovery. 47
In similar fashion, in a dispute between a borrower and guarantor against a
lender, the court in Paul Jacobs, P.C. v. Encore Bank, N.A. found that no waiver by
substantially invoking judicial process had occurred. 48 What were the
circumstances deemed to not constitute waiver? The borrower, though aware of
the arbitration clause from the time suit was filed, waited eight months to
demand arbitration. 49 During this period, the lender’s first summary judgment
on the merits was granted, and the second motion for summary judgment was
filed. 50 In addition, the borrower asserted counterclaims and third-party claims,
responded to the lender’s first motion for summary judgment on the merits, and
filed a motion for a new trial after the court’s unfavorable ruling on the motion
for summary judgment. 51 A respectable argument could be made that this case
was wrongly decided.
But we do have a case where waiver by substantially invoking judicial process
was found.52 In Ellman v. JC General Contractors, an ophthalmologist got into a
dispute with the contractor hired to build his new clinic and surgical center in
El Paso. 53 The court found waiver where, after being sued by his contractor, the
physician waited almost three years to demand arbitration. 54 In the interim, the
physician filed counterclaims, engaged in substantial and extensive discovery on
the merits, filed a joint motion for continuance followed by more discovery, and
otherwise adhered to the court’s scheduling order for many months. 55 The
motion to compel arbitration was filed less than three months before the second
trial setting. 56 The waiver circumstances in this case seem clear and the result
somewhat obvious, but if you have trouble reconciling recent cases that discuss
waiver by substantially invoking judicial process, you are not alone.
D. VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT: UNCONSCIONABILITY?
Once we have determined that an arbitration agreement exists, the dispute
falls within the agreement, and there has been no waiver of the agreement by the
parties, must the parties arbitrate their dispute? Not if the agreement is
procedurally or substantively unconscionable.
We have three opinions in which arbitration agreements were deemed
unconscionable. Briefly summarized, these opinions are:
(1) Venture Cotton Cooperative v. Freeman, in which a group of cotton
farmers entered into an agreement with a shipper that incorporated

47. Id.
48. Paul Jacobs P.C. v. Encore Bank, N.A., No. 01-12-00699-CV, 2013 WL 3467197, at *1, *5
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
49. Id. at *3.
50. Id. at *2.
51. Id.
52. See Ellman v. JC Gen. Contractors, No. 08-12-00029-CV, 2013 WL 5741411, at *4 (Tex.
App.—El Paso Oct. 23, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
53. Id. at *1.
54. Id. at *4.
55. Id. at *1.
56. Id.
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the arbitration rules of the American Cotton Shippers Association. 57
Unfortunately, these rules allowed for the recovery of attorney’s fees
by the shipper on a claim of breach of contract, but eliminated the
farmer’s similar statutory right to such fees; consequently, the
agreement was one-sided, sought to eliminate a statutory remedy,
and was substantively unconscionable. 58
(2) Delfingen US-Texas, L.P. v. Valenzuela, in which a temporary employee
who could not read English was required as a condition of her
employment to sign several documents, one of which included an
arbitration clause. 59 Even though her “illiteracy in English is
insufficient to establish that the Agreement is unconscionable,” 60 the
totality of the circumstances in which her signature on the document
was secured resulted in a determination that the arbitration
agreement was procedurally unconscionable. 61
(3) Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams v. Lopez involved a contract
between a law firm and a client. 62 “Agreements to arbitrate disputes
between attorneys and clients are generally enforceable under Texas
law”; 63 in this case, however, “we conclude that the specific
agreement before the Court is so one-sided that it is unconscionable
under the circumstances.” 64 The one-sided feature that offended the
court was that the agreement reserved the law firm’s right to litigate
its claims against the client but obligated the client to arbitrate his
claims against the firm.65
E. THE BACK END: DID THE ARBITRATORS “EXCEED THEIR AUTHORITY”?
According to the Fifth Circuit, the broad authority of arbitrators may include
an inherent power to impose sanctions. In Hamstein Cumberland Music Group v.
Estate of Williams, 66 an arbitrator awarded a music publisher certain royalties
against the estate of a songwriter and recording artist. The award far exceeded
the actual damages incurred by including $500,000 as a sanction for noncompliance with ordered discovery obligations. 67 The Respondent argued that
the arbitrator was not empowered to issue sanctions and therefore exceeded the
authority granted by Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act.68
57. Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 395 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, pet.
granted).
58. Id. at 276.
59. Delfingen US-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no
pet.).
60. Id. at 801.
61. Id. at 803.
62. Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, L.L.P. v. Lopez, Nos. 13-11-00757-CV, 13-12-0023CV, 2013 WL 3226847, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 27, 2013, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
63. Id. at *6.
64. Id. at *8.
65. Id.
66. Hamstein Cumberland Music Grp. v. Estate of Williams, 532 Fed. App’x 538, 544 (5th
Cir. 2013).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 543.
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Disagreeing with this conclusion, the court found that, “First, arbitrators enjoy
inherent authority to police the arbitration process and fashion appropriate
remedies to effectuate this authority, including with respect to conducting
discovery and sanctioning failure to abide by ordered disclosures.” 69 Holding
that the scope of an arbitrator’s authority is not limited to the arbitration
agreement, the Fifth Circuit viewed the sanctioned party’s own cross-motion for
sanctions as conduct conferring the power on an arbitrator to order sanctions—
almost an estoppel argument. 70
By the time the arbitration of a non-compete dispute could be concluded, the
twelve-month restrictive period on conduct of the departed employees had
expired. This apparently frustrated the arbitrator, who found that the departed
employees had breached the agreement but the former employer had not
suffered monetary damages.
In Nationsbuilders Insurance Services, Inc. v. Houston International Insurance
Group, Ltd., the arbitrator determined that the former employer should “be
restored the benefit of the bargain it made pursuant to the May 4, 2011
Settlement Agreement,” and concluded that “Delaware law supported an
equitable extension of the restrictive period.” 71 The arbitrator awarded the
former employer a twelve-month extension of the restrictions on the departed
employees.72 In the past, the challenge might have been phrased as one of
“manifest disregard of the law,” but these days and in this opinion the departed
employees argued that the arbitrator “exceeded his powers.” 73 Finding that the
equitable extension of the restricted period was within the powers of the
arbitrator, the court noted that the remedy “drew its essence” from the parties’
agreement. 74
The Dallas Court of Appeals also rejected an argument that an arbitration
panel exceeded their powers. 75 In Cambridge Legacy Group, Inc. v. Jain, the
arbitrators awarded the claimant in a FINRA action compensatory damages and
attorney’s fees. 76 On appeal, the respondent argued that the arbitrators
impermissibly subsumed claims the claimant could have brought against
respondent’s wholly owned subsidiaries. 77 When the issue came up during the
arbitration hearing, “the arbitration panel denied [respondent’s] motion to
dismiss and stated they would continue on with the arbitration hearing as if all
three companies were in the same group under the same claim.” 78 The court was
persuaded that the broad language of the arbitration agreement (“all related

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Nationsbuilders Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Houston Int’l Ins. Grp. Ltd., No. 05-12-01103-CV,
2013 WL 3423755, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *4 (referring to a standard set out in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
75. Cambridge Legacy Grp., Inc. v. Jain, 407 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet.
denied).
76. Id. at 447.
77. Id. at 449.
78. Id. at 449–50.

2014]

Alternative Dispute Resolution

111

crossclaims, counterclaims, and/or third-party claims which may be asserted”), as
well as FINRA by-laws, rules, and code of arbitration procedure, captured the
broad claims set out in the arbitration proceeding.79
F. THE BACK END: DISCLOSURES AND “EVIDENT PARTIALITY”
The standards available for setting aside arbitration awards (vacature) have
narrowed, making vacature more and more unlikely for reasons such as
“manifest disregard of the law” or even “exceeded authority.” The “hail Mary”
challenge now appears to be the challenge of “evident partiality,” most often a
discussion of whether an arbitrator failed to disclose circumstances creating a
conflict of interest, or giving rise to even the appearance of a conflict. A new line
of authority is emerging in favor of placing a greater burden on the parties to
reasonably investigate an arbitrator’s potential conflicts.
In Dealer Computer Services v. Michael Motor Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals overruled a District Court ruling that had vacated an arbitration award
in favor of Dealer Computer Services (DCS) on the grounds of “evident
partiality.” 80 In the underlying AAA arbitration, DCS appointed as arbitrator
Ms. Carol Butner. 81 Ms. Butner made various disclosures under the AAA’s
rules.82 After the panel ruled unanimously in favor of DCS, the losing party
(MMC) argued that Ms. Butner’s disclosures were inadequate, particularly her
failure to disclose her service in a prior arbitration involving DCS and similar
contract issues.83 DCS countered that MMC had waived its right to object
because it failed to raise its objection at any time prior to publication of the
award. 84 “A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award based on an arbitrator’s
evident partiality generally must object during the arbitration proceedings.” 85
Reversing the district court and confirming the arbitration award, the court
relied on the following circumstances to support its conclusion that MMC
waived its right to object:
Ms. Butner completed and filed her Acceptance of Party-Appointed
Arbitrator questionnaire;
The questionnaire had a box checked by Ms. Butner next to the statement:
“I HEREBY DISCLOSE THE FOLLOWING;”
Ms. Butner also checked a box that stated: “SEE DISCLOSURE DATED
MAY 23, 2008”;
In the disclosure memorandum, Ms. Butner specifically referred to the
prior arbitration involving DCS;

79. Id. at 450.
80. Dealer Computer Serv. v. Michael Motor Co., 485 Fed. App’x. 724, 725 (5th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 945 (2013).
81. Id. at 726.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 727.
85. Id.
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Ms. Butner checked the “YES” box next to the question: “[h]ave any of the
party representatives, law firms, or parties appeared before you in past
arbitration cases.” 86
“Particularly in light of MMC’s duty to reasonably investigate, Butner’s
disclosures were sufficient to put MMC on notice.” 87
Expect more cases to address the duty of counsel and the parties to investigate
evidence of evident partiality. The duty to investigate appears to be emerging as
a sort of common sense or rule of reason solution to a “gotcha’” problem. The
court in Dealer Computer Services did not address whether Ms. Butner’s prior
service in a similar case involving DCS would presumptively have disqualified
her, but disclosure can cure a lot of ills. Arbitrators, often reluctant to provide
too much detail about involvement in other proceedings that may have been
private and confidential, should consider providing at least enough information
to allow a party to seek further information, if requested. When in doubt,
disclose.
Whether the arbitrator was reluctant or whether the law firm appointing him
to an arbitration panel guided his disclosures is part of the murky record in
Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, in which a $125,000,000
arbitration award—vacated by a trial court—was reinstated in an opinion by the
Dallas Court of Appeals. 88 It would not be surprising if the Texas Supreme
Court, which has accepted a petition for review in this case, sides with the trial
court and vacates the award. While the arbitrator’s disclosures reference his
prior involvement in other matters with the law firm, the record included
disturbing evidence that the law firm assisted in editing the disclosures, and the
disclosures appear to have deliberately downplayed the prior contacts. 89 In
addition, once the party-appointed arbitrators engaged in the task of designating
a third arbitrator, “Stern[, the arbitrator appointed by lawyers Penski and
Boland,] communicated with both Penski and Boland about who should serve
as the third arbitrator. In these communications, Stern referred to [Penski and
Boland’s client] as ‘we’ and ‘us’ and referred to [the other party] as
‘opponents’”. 90 This opinion has the potential to truly shift the burden of
arbitrator disclosures from the arbitrator to the parties. Quoting the Ninth
Circuit: “If arbitration is to work, it must not be subjected to undue judicial
interference. Moreover, parties must be encouraged, nay required, to raise their
complaints about the arbitration during the arbitration process itself, when that
is possible.” 91

86. Id. at 728.
87. Id.
88. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, 376 S.W.3d 358, 360 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2012, pet. granted).
89. Id. at 364.
90. Id. at 365.
91. Id. at 376 (quoting Marino v. Writers Guild of Am. E., Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.
1993)).
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II. MEDIATION
A. ENFORCEABILITY OF MSAS
There are very few windows of opportunity for appellate courts to review any
issue pertaining to mediation. As always, given the informality and lack of
structure of the mediation process, this is as it should be. But in the survey year
several appellate courts turned their attention to the enforcement of mediated
settlement agreements (MSAs).
No opinion of the Texas Supreme Court has ever devoted as much attention
to the enforceability of an MSA as the opinion of In re Stephanie Lee. 92 Though
specifically discussed within the context of the Texas Family Code, the analysis
should be of interest to all.
The Texas Family Code provides that, “[i]f a mediated settlement agreement
meets [certain requirements], a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated
settlement agreement notwithstanding . . . another rule of law.” 93 The Court
summarized its task as follows:
We are called upon today to determine whether a trial court abuses its
discretion in refusing to enter judgment on a statutorily compliant
mediated settlement agreement (MSA) based on an inquiry into whether
the MSA was in a child’s best interest. We hold that this language means
what it says: a trial court may not deny a motion to enter judgment on a
properly executed MSA on such grounds.94
In Lee, the MSA included the following in boldfaced, capitalized, and
underlined letters: “THE PARTIES ALSO AGREE THAT THIS MEDIATION
AGREEMENT IS BINDING ON BOTH OF THEM AND IS NOT SUBJECT
TO REVOCATION BY EITHER OF THEM.” 95 In the face of a lengthy
dissent, the majority held: “Because the MSA in this case meets the Family
Code’s requirements for a binding agreement, and because neither party was a
victim of family violence, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying the motion to enter judgment on the MSA.” 96 Though obviously
decided with strict reference to the Texas Family Code, the opinion reflects a
philosophy that MSAs should be respected and enforced.
That the enforceability of MSAs may be an appellate topic in future cases is
foreshadowed by Cisnado v. Shady Oak Estate Homeowner’s Association, where in a
standard MSA, the parties agreed to perform certain post-mediation actions:
issue payment of settlement proceeds, forward final settlement documents, and
execute and file releases pursuant to an agreed order of dismissal. 97 But plaintiffs
failed to perform their obligations under the MSA, and instead sent opposing
counsel notice that they wished to rescind the agreement and return to

92. In re Stephanie Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013).
93. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 153.0071(e) (West 2008).
94. Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 447.
95. Id. at 448.
96. Id. at 461.
97. Cisnado v. Shady Oak Estate Homeowner’s Ass’n, No. 14-12-00028-CV, 2013 WL
151624, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 15, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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mediation.98 Finding that the plaintiffs had failed to attempt to mandamus the
trial court’s entry of orders incorporating the MSA, the plaintiffs failed to
preserve an opportunity to challenge the MSA. 99 Although the opinion is
decided on procedural grounds, it can be cited as authority for the proposition
that MSAs are binding and enforceable contracts.
Levetz v. Sutton is an intriguing case in which a trial court was found to have
erred in granting a motion to enforce an MSA. 100 This is a rare outcome,
indeed. The facts are complicated, and the outcome was the result of a trial
court hearing on the single issue of whether one of the parties had capacity to
enter into a binding agreement—she alleged that her fibromyalgia, coupled with
sleep deprivation and her medications, resulted in a lack of capacity. 101 The
Court of Appeals determined that the trial court should have also addressed on
an evidentiary basis the alleged breach of the MSA, and therefore returned the
matter for further consideration. 102
As in the opinion just discussed, there was an MSA between siblings who
engaged in a dispute following the death of a parent, but this claim for breach of
the MSA was submitted to a jury! In McDonald v. Fox, the court was not
persuaded that the mere initials of a party’s counsel to a deletion in the MSA of
a particular recipient of life insurance proceeds did not bind the party to the
MSA. 103 “There was other evidence that all parties, including McDonald, were
aware of the deletion before the end of the mediation.” 104 Part of this author’s
fascination with this opinion is the rarity of appellate decisions that address
communication that occurred during mediation. 105 The opinion is not
remarkable in any respect other than that it actually addresses issues such as a
suggestion that the court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the
mediator’s report to the court. 106
B. SHAME, SHAME, SHAME
Should you and your client not adhere to an order by the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals to mediate, you can be scolded. The per curiam decision in
Applewhite v. Applewhite is fascinating:

98. Id. at *2.
99. Id. at *6; see also Gen. Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Stergiou, No. 01-11-00460-CV, 2013 WL
5228494, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013) (mem. op.) (providing an excellent analysis,
not of an MSA, but of a Rule 11 settlement agreement which, like most MSAs, expressly
contemplates the execution of more elaborate settlement documents; the Rule 11 agreement was
deemed binding and enforceable where the details of the subsequent detailed documentation
required to consummate the settlement did not have the same “foundational” importance to the
underlying dispute as the “essential terms” agreed to by the parties.).
100. Levetz v. Sutton, 404 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 806.
103. McDonald v. Fox, No. 13-11-00479-CV, 2012 WL 5591795, at *10 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Nov. 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
104. Id. at *8.
105. See id. at *7.
106. Id. at *9. (“I am pleased to announce that the parties have entered into a settlement of the
case. . . .”).
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[I]t is disturbing and regretful that the parties have apparently defied this
court’s order to mediate this appeal. While we are not privy to the details
of what has transpired, the parties have utterly wasted not only their own
time and resources but those of this court and the mediator, who had
graciously agreed to mediate this appeal at cost. . . . [O]ur system of justice
is dependent upon parties and their attorneys abiding by court orders,
including those court orders that command the parties to schedule and
attend a mediation and not meaningless “squabbling.” Though we are
tempted to issue further orders requiring the parties to comply with this
court’s previous orders, it is apparent from what has already transpired that
doing so would only further waste time and resources.107
C. THE SKY WAS NOT FALLING (OR WAS IT?): THE CHANGE TO RULE 169
The survey year saw a rare and exciting public dispute over an amendment to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This survey chapter on ADR is traditionally
limited to a discussion of appellate cases and the judiciary’s impact on how the
practice of ADR in a survey year has changed. But stepping back a bit, on May
25, 2011, the Texas legislature required that the Supreme Court of Texas adopt
rules “to promote the prompt, efficient, and cost-effective resolution of civil
actions,” particularly actions in which the claim, all inclusive, did not exceed
$100,000.108 The Supreme Court appointed a Task Force. 109 The Task Force
proposals were referred to the Supreme Court Advisory Committee. 110 On
November 13, 2012, the Court proposed new rules and changes. 111 All hell
broke loose in the mediation community, as many felt the landscape of
mediation was shifting.112
The initial proposal removed the discretion to refer certain claims to ADR,
which has been granted to all courts in Texas since the passage of the Texas
Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act in 1987.113 The ADR
community rose up and protested. 114 The final rule allows the parties to agree to
not engage in mediation—which courts previously could ignore—but absent such
agreement the parties can be ordered to mediate for no more than a half-day, for
a mediation fee not to exceed twice the amount of the filing fee. 115 Whether this
107. Applewhite v. Applewhite, No. 02-12-00445-CV (158th Dist. Ct., Denton County., Tex.
Mar. 12, 2013). This author would have liked to have been present for the oral argument.
108. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a) (West Supp. 2013).
109. Order of Appointment of Task Force For Rules in Expedited Cases, Misc. Docket No. 119193 (Tex. Sept. 26, 2011).
110. Id.
111. Order of Adoption of Rules for Dismissals and Expedited Cases, Misc. Docket No. 129191 (Tex. Nov. 13, 2012).
112. See Angela Morris, After tsunami of feedback, Texas Supreme Court revises and issues rule for
expedited
actions,
TEXAS
LAWYER
BLOG
(Feb.
15,
2013),
http://texaslawyer.typepad.com/texas_lawyer_blog/2013/02/after-tsunami-of-feedback-texassupreme-court-revises-and-issues-rule-for-expedited-actions.html. The feedback referred to by the
Texas Lawyer reporter consists of hundreds of unpublished letters to the Court by mediators and
others in the short time-frame allowed. Anecdotally, the author participated as a panelist at a
conference of the Texas Association of Mediators in Dallas on Feb. 23, 2013, on the topic of Is Rule
169 the Beginning of the End of Mediation?
113. Misc. Docket No. 12-919 at 10.
114. See Morris, supra note 112.
115. TEX. R. CIV. P. 169(d)(4) (2013).

116

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 1

new rule alters the mediation landscape remains to be seen, but the fury with
which the initial proposal was met is a clear indication that the mediation
community has become a self-aware community, interested in preserving
mediation as a commercial enterprise.
It has been pointed out that the 1987 statute was passed during an era of
concern that our civil justice system was collapsing, ineffective, irrelevant, and
broken. So after a quarter of a century of “mediation every where, all the time,”
where are we?
The Texas ADR act has been remarkably effective in providing litigants and
courts an earlier, institutionalized method of settlement: the court-ordered,
timely use of a trained settlement expert, mediator or other neutral. It is unclear,
however, whether the actual rate of settlement has increased since 1987. No known
research exists in Texas to support such a claim. 116
III. INSURANCE APPRAISALS
Wind and hail and other weather events can wreak havoc on commercial and
residential property. In this survey year, due a surge in activity in this area, it
seems appropriate to call attention to an ADR procedure unique to property
damage insurance claims: the appraisal process.
Appraisal clauses in insurance agreements provide a process for resolving
disputes about a property’s value or the amount of a covered loss.117 Typically
the clause resembles the following:
If we and you disagree on the amount of loss, either may make written
demand for an appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will select a
competent and impartial appraiser and notify the other of the appraiser
with 20 days of such demand. The two appraisers will select an umpire. If
they cannot agree within 15 days upon such umpire, either may request
that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. Each
appraiser will state separately the amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they
will submit their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two
will be binding as to the amount of loss. 118
In theory appraisal clauses are sensible and intuitive. Should the insured and
insurer fail to agree—in the context of a covered claim—about the amount of the
loss or value of the property, the appraisal provides a relatively efficient method
for turning the decision over to knowledgeable tradesmen, eliminating the need
for lawyers, lawsuits, experts, and trials. But in practice, controversy abounds.
There was very little controversy involving appraisals until the Texas Supreme
Court decided State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson in 2009. 119 Appraisals were to

116. Frank A. Elliott & Kay Elkins Elliott, Exciting Expedited Innovations: Whose Needs Matter
More?, ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTIONS, Summer 2013, at 27. This article is an excellent history and
analysis of the Rule 169 debacle.
117. In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 405 (Tex. 2011).
118. In re Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-13-00003-CV, 2013WL 692441, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Austin Feb. 21, 2013, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
119. State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009).
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determine the amount of loss, not coverage or liability. 120 In a perfect violation
of the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” rule, the Court completely changed the
appraisal landscape, stating that appraisers “must always consider causation, at
least as an initial matter. An appraisal is for damages caused by a specific
occurrence, not every repair a home might need.” 121 The opinion has been a
disaster, according to some commentators. This has produced a result sought by
neither insurers nor insureds, making the appraisal process now a minefield of
confusion, added cost, additional litigation, additional delay, and uncertainty:
Johnson’s broad language does a disservice to insurers and insureds. Instead
of limiting the reasoning in Johnson to the facts in the summary judgment
record, the Texas Supreme Court went far beyond the facts to permit futile
exercises which needlessly complicate and increase the cost of a claim and
ultimately litigation. 122
With this background and with an appreciation for why appellate court
treatment of appraisal was relatively rare for decades, we now note an opinion
from the survey year in the aftermath of Johnson and In re: Universal Underwriters.
In In re Guideone Mutual Insurance Company, in a truly remarkable conclusion,
waiver did not occur where the insurer invoked appraisal “several years after
litigation commenced and two months before a trial setting.” 123
The court stated that
[The insured] contends it has been prejudiced because it incurred litigation
expenses due to [the insurer’s] delay before invoking the appraisal process.
Over a period of several years, the parties engaged in the discovery process,
answering written discovery, taking deposition, and disclosing experts. The
expenses [the insured] incurred developing its case included approximately
$10,000 in expert fees for accounting services and over $100,000 in
attorney fees. Nevertheless, the mandamus record does not establish that these
expenses would not have been incurred if [the insurer] had moved for appraisal
earlier.124
Perhaps this is what the court in Universal Underwriters meant in saying “it is
difficult to see how prejudice could ever be shown.” 125
120. Id. at 889.
121. Id. at 893.
122. Mark A. Ticer et al., Appraisal In the New World Order, J. TEX. INS. LAW, Spring 2013, at 4.
This article is an excellent and balanced summary of the history and current status of the appraisal
process in Texas. The next landmark decision by the Texas Supreme Court, also outside the survey
year, was In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011), finding that
waiver of appraisal occurs when it is not invoked within a reasonable time form the point of
“impasse” between the parties, and announcing a prejudice requirement, a prong to the waiver test
that “it is difficult to see how prejudice could ever be shown when the policy . . . gives both sides
the same opportunity to demand appraisal”. Id. at 409, 412.
123. In re Guideone Mut. Ins. Co., No. 09-12-00581-CV, 2013 WL 257371, at *1, *3 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Jan. 24, 2013, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.) (emphasis added).
124. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
125. Universal, 345 S.W.3d at 412. No waiver was also the result in In re Texas Windstorm
Insurance Association, No. 14-13-00632-CV, 2013 WL 4806996, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
District] Sept. 10, 2013 orig. proceeding) (mem. op.), regardless of the argument made by the
insured that the insurer waited until after suit was filed to invoke appraisal. Again, no waiver was
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The author predicts that a considerable amount of attention by the insurance
industry, consumer advocates, the Texas Department of Insurance, and the
Texas legislature will be focused on appraisal sooner, rather than later. The use,
and misuse, of the process is now common. The process is working to the
benefit of no one. There are no rules, no standards, no ethical guidelines—just a
wild, wild west sort of chaos. Clip on a shiny badge and you can be the sheriff!
Changes are in order.
IV. CONCLUSION
The expansion of mediation and arbitration and the increase in the use of the
appraisal process are evidence that our civil justice system remains broken. Our
courthouses are imperfect forums; the litigation process is so slow, so expensive,
and so inefficient as to be irrelevant to many. But with the steady increase in the
use of alternative methods of dispute resolution comes an increase in the
concerns and the controversies over how these alternatives are evolving. We may
have reached the saturation point with mediation. The unexpected proposed
rule change in the survey year to scale back judicial discretion to order parties to
mediate may have been a way to send an “enough is enough” message. We seem
obsessed with mediation to the point that virtually every pending lawsuit in
most jurisdictions around the state is ordered to mediation at least once, even
over the objections of the parties. Is this the vision of mediation that sponsors
and promoters of the ADR statute had in 1987? It is doubtful. That today’s
advocates often prefer to skip the “joint session” at the outset of mediation,
something almost unthinkable in the practice of mediation twenty years ago,
might be a sign that too much mediation sometimes results in a mechanical
approach to the process.
Even more controversy swirls around arbitration, especially in the consumer
and employment contexts. Sometimes it now seems that courts are too willing to
acquiesce in allowing arbitration to be imposed on the unknowing and
unwilling through the wide use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses, regardless of
how adhesive these “agreements” truly are.
In the world of commercial arbitration, many have voiced the opinion that
arbitration has become “The New Litigation,” more expensive, more timeconsuming, and more inefficient than litigation. 126
How did we get to this point, and where is the use of ADR headed? One
thing is certain about ADR: it may be evolving, but it is not going away.

the result in In re Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-13-00003, 2013 WL 692441, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Austin Feb. 21, 2013, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.).
126. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New Litigation, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2010);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation”, 7 DEPAUL BUS.
& COM. L.J. 383 (2009). Professor Stipanowich was instrumental in the publication of Protocols For
Expectations, Cost-Effective Commercial Arbitration , published in 2010 by the College of Commercial
Arbitrators, following a “summit” of major participants in the field of arbitration in 2009. THOMAS
J. STIPANOWICH ET AL., PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIONS, COST-EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1 (2010).

